socialism and Communist Party supremacy, although he did much to undermine both.
Like so many other Chinese reformers dating from the late Qing dynasty, Deng sought to borrow a variety of methods and technologies from foreign nations and graft them to indigenous structures. Yet what sets Deng apart from his reformist predecessors is that he was able to break out of the confines of the ti-yong strategy of selective borrowing (yang) while attempting to protect Chinese cultural essence (ti). Deng was far more prepared to import anything that would enrich China's productive base without much concern for its corrosive effect on Chinese culture. His Four Cardinal Principles notwithstanding, Deng adopted eclectic methods in his attempt to lift China out of poverty and its feudal past and deliver it into the modem era, with all the attendant accoutrements of great power status.
Studying Deng Xiaoping's Political Behaviour
This article examines Deng's political behaviour over time in order to explain this complexity. It intentionally does not adopt the approach of analysing Deng's policy pronouncements on various issues as indicative of his political style, as there is frequently a disjuncture between word and deed among politicians world-wide. In some cases Deng's speeches 2 do reflect the content of his political programme and philosophy and they will be drawn upon in such cases, but on the whole the aim is to study Deng's political behaviour: his administrative workstyle, policy agenda, strategies and tactics of rule, sources and uses of power, interactions with colleagues, subordinates and would-be successors, and methods of decision-making and policy implementation. This multi-factor analysis requires studying different periods and events in Deng's career, drawing upon multiple sources of information. 3 A straightforward chronological approach will not suffice analytically, although it might reveal a learning curve in the conclusions that Deng drew from previous experiences for his subsequent workstyle. 4 The focus is therefore on Deng as an individual politician. While his political behaviour must be viewed in the context of his time in power, this is not necessarily an essay on the Deng era in Chinese politics (1978 onward), his reform programme, or even his political legacy from this period. 5 Deng's career in Chinese Communist politics has spanned more than six decades, and his entire professional record is the subject of this analysis. However, because Benjamin Yang's contribution to this volume concentrates on Deng's pre-1949 years, and others assess Deng along a variety of other professional dimensions, this analysis is largely limited to Deng's post-1949 political career.
As the other assessments attest, Deng's career was professionally diverse -working on Communist Party political and organizational matters, the economy, social policy, foreign relations, military affairs, science, technology and educational issues. This professional diversity gave him substantive experience in a variety of issue areas, accumulating the skills of a political generalist necessary for advancement to the pinnacle of Chinese Communist politics. 6 5. To some extent this is done in the other contributions to this volume, but also see Michel Oksenberg, "The Deng era's uncertain political legacy," in Kenneth Lieberthal et al. 6. This is a characteristic noted as generally necessary for upward mobility in Chinese elite politics. See some similar tendencies to China's previous pre-eminent leader, Mao Zedong/ which, as well as the differences, will be contrasted.
Three Paradigms of Analysis
This analysis of Deng's political behaviour draws upon three paradigms, each of which emphasizes different dimensions of leadership style. These models provide a useful framework to study Deng as an individual politician, and in addition it is hoped the case study will be able to refine them in a Chinese and comparative context. It is important to note at the outset that these approaches to studying elite political behaviour are not mutually exclusive; just as leaders employ different methods of rule simultaneously so too must analysts employ different paradigms in tandem.
The first paradigm is the traditional "power base" approach. This method is useful for analysing how a politician moves up through the organizational hierarchies (Party, Army, State) and develops a leadership domain. In China, it is argued that power bases are of four principal varieties: credentialist, personal, institutional and territorial. A credentialist power base derives from a politician's rise through the ranks. How was he recruited; how did he rise to the top of the system; what skills and credentials did he amass along the way; what were his defining socializing experiences, and what effect did they have on his subsequent elite mobility and political style? Personal power bases in the Chinese political system are of two principal types: patron-client and issue-based factional networks. Institutional power bases in China are rooted in the Party, state and military bureaucracies. Lastly, with a territorial power base, power derives from particular regions of the country.
The second paradigm is the "paramount leader" approach. This is a term often used to describe Deng, particularly insofar as he never held the official portfolio of President, Chairman or General Secretary of the Communist Party, or Premier of the State Council, although he did serve as General Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Vice-Premier of the State Council. This approach seeks to understand Deng's style as supreme leader of the nation, even though he did not hold the paramount official positions. It is perhaps more appropriate to describe Deng's role as a patriarch, not unlike a Mafia godfather ruling from behind the scenes through a network of loyal lieutenants. 8 But the question here is not so much whether Deng was a paramount leader or patriarch, but how he exercised supreme authority. Did he have a dictatorial style -issuing commands, ruling by fiat, intervening in a variety of policy arenas when he saw fit, and brooking no opposition? Or did he act more as an arbiter -standing above the fray, reconciling competing interests, seeking conflicting opinions, and entering into the policy process in order to resolve stalemate? Did he adopt a consensual and collective decision-making style that played down conflict among subordinates, instead seeking consensus and the most rational choice of policy alternatives? Or did he utilize a combination of these methods at different times? These questions are examined in contra-distinction to China's other paramount leader, Mao Zedong.
The third paradigm focuses on agenda-setting. It is an approach that examines the national political agenda, and looks both at its content and at the degree to which a given leader sets that agenda. How did Deng seek to set the national agenda, what were his methods for doing so and how successful was he? If rival elites "captured" the agenda or moved in a direction not to Deng's liking, how did he respond? How did he seek to regain the initiative? Did he work through bureaucratic channels? Did he call a Politburo meeting to make his case? Did he, as Mao often did, appeal directly to the masses when he encountered resistance at the top? In general, did Deng favour an institutionalist, populist, or machiavelli an approach, or some combination thereof? This paradigm also explores ways in which a leader manipulates the agenda to pursue specific political goals. For example, can issues and policies be used to bolster political allies or undermine enemies?
An integral part of the agenda-setting paradigm is how a leader bargains and builds a coalition to adopt and implement a given policy or package of policies. Only in the most totalitarian of political systems is policy decided by the complete dominance of the supreme leader and implemented by a subserviant bureaucracy. In most political systemsincluding authoritarian socialist ones -leaders must lobby their colleagues and subordinates to support their policy initiatives. They must build, in William Riker's phrase, "winning coalitions."9 Bargaining is necessary to build elite coalitions to adopt policy, but also to implement it at national, regional and local levels. A recent emphasis in studying Chinese politics adopts this approach and argues that in a system characterized by "fragmented authoritarianism" bargaining is the defining characteristic of political life and takes place at every level of the system. 10 To what degree does Deng Xiaoping fit this bargaining paradigm? What trade-offs did he make at key junctures to have his policies adopted and implemented? Who did he bargain with and what was the quid pro quo? Of importance in this context are the channels of policy implementation that Deng preferred. Did Deng prefer to work through traditional bureaucratic hierarchies (xitong); did he adopt the campaign (yundong) style of his predecessor Mao; did he use a "test point" (shi dian) approach; did he discharge responsibility to a cluster of key advisers; or did he even concern himself with issues of implementation?
These three paradigms and their constituent parts offer a framework to dissect and analyse Deng Xiaoping's career in the Chinese political system. By examining them sequentially it will be possible to ascertain which have the greatest explanatory value, and in what combination Deng employed different stratagems and tactics, drew upon different sets of political resources and established patterns of interaction with other elites.
Deng Xiaoping's Power Bases The Right Revolutionary Credentials
Deng Xiaoping belonged to the first generation of Chinese Communist revolutionary elites (lao yidai de gemingjia). This fact alone may be the most important of all power bases as it confers a legitimacy that other more objective measures cannot match. Mere participation in the epic events of the Chinese revolutionary struggle and the personal ties Deng forged with other leading CCP figures in the process guaranteed him a place among the elite once political power had been attained.
Deng Xiaopingll joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924 12 at the age of 20 while working in a Renault factory in Billancourt, France. While in France Deng established one working partnership that would help shape his entire career -with Zhou Enlai. Zhou helped recruit Deng into the CCP and became a life-long patron, although Mao proved more central to Deng's political ascent. Zhou was quick to recognize Deng's organizational abilities. When Zhou returned to Guangzhou from Paris in 1924, he entrusted the publication of the French cell of the General European Branch of the CCP, Red Light, to Deng. Deng had no experience as an editor or writer, but was well-versed in the mechanics of early "desk top" publishing. Red Light was printed in mimeograph form, and Deng acquired the nom de plume "Docteur du Duplication." Another colleague of Deng's Parisian days was Li Weihan, a notable CCP figure who later worked closely with Deng on united front matters, and upon 11. Deng's given name at birth was Deng Bin. In France he went by Deng Xixian. There is some discrepancy as to when he changed it to Xiaoping. In many of his Western biographies (e.g. Goodman) it is dated from 1925, but one chronological biography dates it specifically as June 1927 in Wuhan so that he could maintain a false identity and hide from local Kuomintang police; see whom Deng called to direct this sphere when he reorganized the Central Committee Secretariat in 1956.13 Deng left Paris for Moscow in January 1926, travelling via Berlin. He stayed nearly a year studying Marxism-Leninism at the University of the Toilers of the East and Sun Yat-sen University.14 However he was never really fond of the classroom or Marxist theory, and after eight years abroad was anxious to return to make a more practical contribution to the revolution in his native land. In his absence the Republic had been further fractured by rival warlords and a sense of crisis gripped the nation.
Deng returned to China in early 1927, apparently accompanying the warlord Feng Yuxiang (the "Christian General").15 Feng was at that time co-operating with the KMT -CCP united front, and he headed the Sun Yat-sen Military Academy in Xi'an. He was in Moscow in search of Comintern funding for the Academy. Deng returned to Feng's Academy and was put in charge of political training. He organized political training for officers, thus beginning a long involvement with commissar work in the armed forces, and was also appointed resident Communist Party secretary at the Academy. Following the April 1927 Shanghai massacre and abrogation of the first CCP-KMT united front, Feng Yuxiang purged his forces of known and suspected Communists in an effort to show his support for Chiang Kai-shek. Deng was one of over 50 CCP members expelled from the Academy, but whose lives were spared (one can speculate that it was Feng's Christianity that prevented him from following Chiang Kai-shek's 1927 reign of white terror).
Deng then made his way south to Hankou. Thus began his inclusion in the inner circle of CCP leaders. At first, he was appointed as a lowly secretary of the Central Committee, but his rank and stature grew rapidly. By the end of the summer of 1927, following the secret relocation of the Party headquarters to Shanghai, Deng was appointed chief secretary (zong mishu) for the Central Committee. This was a plum assignment for Deng as he was responsible for handling all inner-party "documents, orders, communications and assignments."16It also gave him the opportunity to renew acquaintance with Zhou Enlai and other comrades from his Parisian days as well as to meet other key CCP leaders for the first time.
13. Deng and Li also had their differences, including the fact that Li apparently persuaded Deng's first wife to leave him. Having divorced, Jin Weiying (A lin) and Li Weihan (Lo Man) had Li Tieying -whom Deng has promoted in high Party councils in recent years.
14. Both "universities" were established by the Comintern for the purpose of training would-be revolutionaries. The former was intended for those from the Middle East and Asia, while the latter was headed by Comintern agent Pavel Mif and established with Comintern funds in 1925 specifically to train young Chinese radicals (both Communists and Nationalists) in the theoretical and practical tools of revolution. Many of the so-called "28 Bolsheviks" who returned to China to constitute the "internationalist" wing of the Party studied there, but it is unclear what -if any -relations Deng had with them. One key "returned Bolshevik" was Yang Shangkun, with whom Deng would subsequently forge close ties, who arrived at the university a year after Deng's departure. Deng's rehabilitation no doubt came with Zhou Enlai's blessing, as Zhou was at this time overseeing the rehabilitation of cadres and reconstitution of the party-state apparatus. Deng's return must therefore be seen as part of a broader pattern of rehabilitations engineered by Zhou at this time, even though Deng was the most senior victim of the Cultural Revolution to be returned to power and the Chairman's imprimateur was necessary.25
Knowing that he had cancer, Zhou groomed Deng to succeed him as Premier, turning over the daily management of the State Council to him in 1974. While undergoing cobalt radiation treatment for his cancer, Zhou relied on Deng to manage affairs of state. Zhou dispatched Deng to the United Nations in October to deliver a major policy address on world affairs (in which Deng outlined Mao's "theory of the three worlds") and Deng stood in for Zhou on a number of occasions. One of Zhou's last public acts was to announce the "Four Modernizations" programme at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975; Deng drafted the speech and crafted the programme. Fittingly, it was Deng who read the eulogy at Zhou's memorial service on 15 January 1976. In a macabre turn of Politburo politics Deng's oration was to spell his own political death and would be his last public appearance until 1977. Within six weeks Zhou's arrangements for the succession were overturned by the Gang of Four (with Mao's acquiesence) and Deng was purged for the third time in his career.
Mao's support was thus crucial to Deng's career during the 1950s and early 1960s, although it seems that the Chairman had misgivings about Deng during the commune movement of 1958 and again during the Socialist Education Movement in 1964. 26 However, it was Deng's power base in the Secretariat, and the policy programme to emerge from that body during the early 1960s, that gave the Chairman primary cause for concern. As early as November 1956 Mao began to take note of Deng's dominance of the Secretariat, referring to it as his "nest."27 As the alarming reports of famine in the countryside began to reach the leadership in early 1960 Deng audaciously began to distance himself from Mao and the Great Leap (which he had earlier supported) by giving several speeches around the country to criticize "problems in Mao's thinking" (Mao Zedong sixiang de wenti).28 When Mao withdrew to the "second line" after 1960 the Secretariat under Deng became a key locus of decision-making and target of the Chairman's ire. Mao reportedly chastised Deng in 1964 for not keeping him informed of state policy and building an "independent kingdom" (duli wangguo) in the Party Secretariat. 29 Mao was particularly upset with the "60 Articles on Promoting Higher Education," which Deng had taken charge of drafting but apparently had not shown to him. "Who was the emperor making such a decision?" queried the Chairman. 3o It is not surprising that those who worked closely with Deng on the Secretariat became early targets of Mao's Cultural Revolution purges' and the institution itself was disbanded.
Mao clearly had serious ideological differences with Deng and other Politburo members during this time as he perceived them to be instituting revisionist capitalist restoration in several policy spheres (particularly in rural policy and education) under the guise of economic recovery from the Great Leap. Revolution as the "number 2 person in authority taking the capitalist road," and encountered the Chairman's wrath again in 1976, when he was purged following the Tiananmen Incident. 32 But in the pre-1949 period and throughout the 1950s Mao was primarily responsible for Deng's rapid rise through the higher Party ranks. In 1954 when Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing Mao pointed to Deng and said: "See that little man there? He is highly intelligent and has a great future ahead of him.'>33 Coincidentally it was Deng whom Mao dispatched to the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956, only to hear Khrushchev's tirade against Stalin. Mao subsequently called upon Deng to help manage Sino-Soviet relations during the disagreements of 1960-63. 34 Mao also entrusted Deng with administering the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957 (for which Deng never showed contrition).
Liu Shaoqi. Deng' s ties to Liu Shaoqi were never as close as it has been assumed from their common fate in 1967. They were more contemporaries than in a hierarchical patron--client relationship, although they worked in a mutually supportive fashion. Deng's opposition to Gao 36. At the time Deng believed that the purge of non-Party intellectuals and soldiers was warranted, but in the 1980s confessed that the scope of the movement had been too broad although he refused to repudiate the campaign itself. See "Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 19 March 1980," Selected Works, p. 279. ration that they drew Mao's wrath during the Cultural Revolution, although their joint "mismanagement" of the work teams in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution also contributed to their downfall.
None the less, Liu Shaoqi's and Deng's collaboration was more by virtue of position and proximity than patronage. They had complementary expertise, as Liu was more the theorist and Deng the organization man, but their relationship was never as conspiratorial as the Red Guard materials suggest.
Peng Zhen. In contrast, Deng and Peng Zhen had a longer and closer relationship. They worked closely together on the Secretariat during the mid-1950s. Peng was appointed Deng's second in command at the First Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, and they were the only two Politburo members serving on the Secretariat at the time. Deng frequently discharged important responsibilities to Peng, particularly in the legal and public security spheres. 37 They made inspection tours together,38 were bridge partners and their families were close friends. strategy, instead generally favouring material incentives and incremental development. Yet they have held different views on the pace and modality of economic reform. Their differences were apparent during the post-Leap recovery,46 but became particularly manifest in the mid to late 1980s when Chen Yun's moderate economic reform programme did not embrace the bolder proposals of Deng, Zhao Ziyang and the economic think tanks and advisers to Zhao. 47 While it is important to recall that Chen supported Deng's reform push during the early 1980s, he headed a faction within the leadership that increasingly sought to blunt the more radical reforms of 1986-88 and 1992-93. After the death of Ye Jianying and the illness of Li Xiannian in the late 1980s, Chen Yun was the only leader of enough stature to challenge Deng and the two increasingly became rivals in their later years. Deng and Zhao during the early 1960s, but others -particularly industrial incentive systems -were new. Deng gave Zhao permission and political protection to experiment boldly at a time when neo-Maoist policies were still in vogue in Beijing. During Zhao's tenure in Sichuan Deng frequently visited to monitor the reforms and consult him.53 Zhao's "production first" policies paralleled Deng's laissez-faire economic philosophy. The reforms were so successful they were dubbed "the Sichuan
With this appointment it became clear that Zhao was one of Deng's two hand-picked successors. Deng's patronage of Zhao lasted until 1989 when the two clashed over the implementation of martial law. Zhao also made the tactical mistake of criticizing Deng in a public session with Mikhail Gorbachev, claiming that a secret Politburo ruling referred all major decisions to Deng -thus in effect passing the blame for economic overheating to his mentor. Zhao also opposed the harsh 26 April editorial that condemned the student demonstrations as "unpatriotic," which was specifically ordered and approved by Deng. Communist history for a purge not to consign an individual to political oblivion. 57 Deng's and Hu's careers intersected at several points after Yan'an. Hu served with Deng as political commissar in the Second Field Army that "liberated" south-western China. In fact, Hu Yaobang was personally responsible for northern Sichuan and oversaw the conquest of Deng's native village of Guang'an. Hu subsequently served in Sichuan under Deng's and Liu Bocheng's command until 1952 when he and Deng were transferred to Beijing at the same time. 58 Hu went on to a lengthy career as head of the Communist Youth League before being purged in 1967. Perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not, Deng and Hu were both rehabilitated in March 1973. As Deng set about structuring the "Four Modernizations" programme in 1975, he called upon Hu Yaobang to reconstitute the Academy of Sciences. Hu's September 1975 "Summary Report" on the Academy was the basis for the subsequent rehabilitation of thousands of researchers purged during previous campaigns and the assertion of "expertise" over "redness." A close working alliance for reform was forged. They shared a common purpose of rolling back the Cultural Revolution. Unfortunately, their work was abruptly interrupted by Zhou Enlai's death and Deng's subsequent dismissal. With Deng's return in 1977 Hu stood ready to assist him, and a decade-long partnership ensued.
Patrons, clients, colleagues and enemies. Thus, throughout his career Deng had two principal patrons -Mao and Zhou, with Mao by far the more longstanding and important one. Liu Bocheng also served as a patron of sorts during the civil war, which was important to Deng's cultivation of a career and power base in the armed forces.
Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Peng Dehuai and Chen Yun must all be considered close colleagues of Deng's, though without the attributes of patronage. Later in their careers Chen Yun turned from colleague to competitor, but in retrospect their disagreements were more a matter of degree than substance. Similarly Deng's long-time ally Yang Shangkun also turned into a competitor of sorts, although much of the overt scheming against Deng must be credited to his half-brother Yang It is interesting to note that Deng had few real enemies during his 57. There are a few precedents for purged leaders retaining their Central Committee seats (e.g. Wang Ming, Peng Dehuai and Hua Guofeng), but only in pro forma fashion.
58. It is possible that Deng brought Hu to Zhou Enlai's attention at the time and arranged for his transfer to the capital.
career. This is not to say that he was not ruthless, as he did purge many and was responsible for numerous ruined careers from the 1942 Yan'an rectification to the 14th Party Congress and Eighth National People's Congress in 1992-93. But rivals, adversaries and enemies must be distinguished. Certainly Deng had many adversarial relationships, including at times with Mao, Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng, and he even had rather formidable disagreements with Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin, but none can really be considered a political enemy. Certainly none approached the contempt he felt for Jiang Qing and her erstwhile ally Zhang Chunqiao.
Deng's true clients in the Party were Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. In the military Deng had a broad network of ties stemming from his Second Field Army connections. Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing were two of the most prominent, apart from Yang Shangkun, as they protected Deng in internal exile in the south during 1975-77. Jiang Zemin, Li Tieying, Zhu Rongji and Wang Zhaoguo must all be considered latter-day clients. Deng personally promoted them all. Indeed, individuals such as Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan could not have risen to the top (nor could Li Peng have stayed there) without Deng's approval. But none of these was a client of Deng's in a true sense of the term. He did not cultivate them over time and each owed as much, if not more, personal loyalty to other senior elites. In a sense they all benefited from Deng's reform programme more than from Deng himself. Yet, as was the case under Mao, it is difficult to rise to the pinnacle of power without the blessing of the patriarch.
Deng's Institutional Power Bases
Deng did not rule through intimidation or coercion, terrorizing the populace with draconian security services (the 1989 Beijing massacre being the obvious exception). Nor did he lead the nation by great personal charisma, although he certainly possessed prestige and commanded respect. Nor did ideology serve as a tool of his leadership -his disdain for it was barely concealed. Deng's preferred modus operandi was to manoeuvre behind the scenes but, having taken a decision, to implement policy through established bureaucratic channels. In other words, he was a backroom politician who depended on Party institutions and Leninist norms to implement decisions. This was true throughout most of his career.
Unlike Mao, Deng was an organization man. For most of his career he worked in, and believed in working through, bureaucratic structures. Later in life, however, like Mao, he became frustrated with an organizational approach to rule and began to rely on the voluntarist impulses of the citizenry.
In 1991-92 Deng experienced the frustrations of being a retired patriarch. He encountered entrenched bureaucratic interests and designated successors who pursued their own agendas. Unable to kick-start economic reform through normal bureaucratic channels and seemingly surrounded by disloyal lieutenants, Deng adopted the Maoist approach of taking his case straight to the people during his famous February 1992 Southern Sojourn (nan xun). By bringing pressure from below and reinjecting himself into the limelight, Deng trapped his opponents and seized back the political initiative. This leap-frogging technique was employed repeatedly by Mao in similar circumstances.
Despite his preference for institutional rule, like any leader Deng exhibited intolerance of bureaucratic inertia and incompetence. As Martin King Whyte's contribution to this volume makes clear, Deng championed meritocracy and streamlining of bloated bureaucracy. Deng's concept of "political reform" (zhengzhi gaige) was really one of administrative reform (xingzheng gaige). The devolution of decision-making power and removal of the state and Party bureaucracy from guiding economic activity was a centre-piece of his reform package. Deng was very supportive of Zhao Ziyang's 1984 and 1988 overhaul ofthe State Council apparatus, as well as Zhu Rongji's 1993 reforms. But it is important to keep in mind that these streamlining efforts were actually aimed at strengthening the bureaucracy, thereby enhancing the party-state's capacities, rather than dismantling the Leninist apparat.
Since Deng believed in leadership via organization, it must also be asked whether he used certain organizations to build a personal power base. Deng never worked in a functional ministerial system or in a mass organization like the Communist Youth League, but he did build power bases in the Party Secretariat and PLA for lengthy periods.
To head the Secretariat was an extraordinarily sensitive and powerful position. Information is an important source of power in a bureaucratic environment -and Deng had a near-monopoly on it. He had ultimate control over the ten functional departments of the Central Committee: propaganda, organization, united front work, finance and economics, industry and communications, rural work, foreign trade, investigation (i.e. intelligence), military affairs and international liaison (external Communist Party relations). This was a very powerful cluster of institutions. Deng had overall responsibility, assisted by the other members of the Secretariat 59 and the head of the staff office (Yang Shangkun). These were powerful individuals in their own right as each was responsible for a department and its constituent ministerial system (xitong), and each department functioned quite independently.60 Each member thereby served as the "opening" (kou) in his assigned issue area to the Central Committee, Politburo and its Standing Committee. Still, from the Eighth Party Congress to the aftermath of the Great Leap the Secretariat was primarily a body for policy implementation (not formulation) and staffing. During these years (1956--62) its principal purpose was to process documents and disseminate policy decisions taken by Mao, the 59 It is true that various leaders were involved in this process, but Deng held the power of co-ordination. He took charge of the 60 Articles on Higher Education himself and had a significant input to the documents on commerce, finance, science, industry and communes. Taken together, these programmatic documents served as the basis not only for the recovery from the Great Leap but, more importantly, the relative exclusion of Mao from the policy process.
Deng, Liu, Zhou, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Zhou Yang and Lu Dingyi collectively took control of the Party and government. Deng's power and prestige definitely grew, but not disproportionate to others'. With Mao in the "second line" the leadership was remarkably collectivist. Deng worked well with his colleagues. This is certainly not the picture of Deng's Secretariat portrayed by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. One diatribe claimed: "During the period Deng Xiaoping was in charge of work at the Secretariat of the Central Committee, he consistently monopolized power, made arbitrary decisions, and met Chairman Mao on equal terms without ceremony."63 As noted above, Mao was particularly distressed about Deng's education programme. The 60 Articles on Higher Education proposed the restoration of academic degrees, titles, and salaries; the abolition of "absolute leadership of the Party" (dang de juedui lingdao) over institutions of higher learning; an end to class struggle in universities; and curtailment of Mao's work-study programme (shixi) for university faculty and students. The Chairman was also angry with the draft 60 Articles on People's Communes which sought to introduce the sanzi yihao ("three 63. ''Ten major accusations against Deng Xiaoping," Ba-er-wu zhanbao, p. 15. This document is drawn from a speech given by Jiang Qing. freedoms, one contract") policy, change the basic accounting unit to the production brigade, and alter the size of communal mess halls. Mao countered with the "First Ten Points," to which Deng and Liu Shaoqi responded with the "Second Ten Points." Indeed, the entire series of policy documents drafted under Deng's aegis eventually drew Mao's ire during the Cultural Revolution. Mao was troubled not only by the content of the documents, but by the fact that Deng, allegedly, did not consult him throughout the drafting process. 64 Deng evidently took the Chairman's "retirement to the second line" too seriously.
When Deng was returned to power in the early 1970s he tended to work through the State Council and its constituent ministries and commissions. As ranking "first Vice-Premier" he set about reorganizing the State Council and promulgating a series of programmatic documents to guide national construction. In so doing he encountered stiff resistance from Jiang Qing and her minions. 65
Deng also used his positions as chief of PLA General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission to use these bodies to overturn Lin Biao's influence in the military. Indeed, as June Teufel Dreyer's contribution illustrates, he had a strong constituency in the PLA. This was based on a network of personal ties growing out of the Second Field Army, as well as institutionally in the military-industrial complex. 66
After Deng outmanoeuvred Hua Guofeng and became paramount leader during the 1980s he came to rely more on individuals than institutions. During this time Deng tended to rule in traditional imperial fashion by making broad policy pronouncements, monitoring the overall progress of policy, but restricting his interventions to moments when his policies or political allies were flagging.
Territorial Power Bases
While Deng had bases of power among individuals and institutions, he did not possess a territorial power base during his career. Of course, he took great interest in his native Sichuan,67 often making inspection tours of the province, and together with Liu Bocheng ruled the south-west from 64 1977 he enjoyed the protection of regional military barons Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing, as well as Ye Jianying, but never developed a territorial base of power. Deng's power always derived from institutions and personalities at the Centre.
Deng as Paramount Leader
Deng's position as paramount leader never rivalled Mao's. Deng never sought the absolute authority that Mao possessed and wielded, as he was convinced that Mao's dictatorial style and cult of personality (geren chongbai) were the principal reasons China endured economic and political crisis for much of the period after 1957. "Generally speaking, Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership was correct before 1957, but he made more and more mistakes after the anti-rightist struggle of that year," Deng opined in 1980. 69 Much of Mao's workstyle troubled Deng deeply, and upon ousting Hua Guofeng and becoming China's paramount leader himself in 1982 he was committed to ruling differently.
The major difference between Mao and Deng as paramount leader was the manner in which they dealt with other leaders and subordinates. Deng's style was far more consensus-oriented and decisions were taken more collectively. This is partly because Deng tended to approach problems methodically and delved more deeply into the specifics of a case (induction), whereas Mao often sought to form policy from ideological doctrine in an arbitrary and dialectical fashion (deduction). "Seek truth from facts," was Deng's watchword. Another reason is that Deng was not afraid to delegate authority; that is what he had done throughout his career. Deng himself reflected on how he ran the Secretariat from 1956 to 1966, in a speech to the Fifth Plenum of the 11 th Central Committee in 1980 (which resurrected the Secretariat): "I think it is fair to say that the former Secretariat of the Central Committee was quite efficient, partly because once the relevant decisions were made, specific tasks were assigned to particular persons, who were given broad powers and allowed to handle matters independently."7o Mao, on the other hand, avoided delegating authority and always sought to retain key decisions in his own hands.71 To some extent Deng sought to make the key decisions-particularly on foreign policy -but, on the whole, he broadly delegated authority. 72 Nor did Deng foster tensions among subordinates to test their loyalties as did Mao, and while Deng had to remove two groomed successors he did not have to fear that Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang were trying to usurp his own power. 73 Deng knew who his enemies were and who opposed his policies, and he manoeuvred effectively to isolate and then overcome them. Deng's manoeuvring against Hua Guofeng, the "whateverists" and "Small Gang of Four" between 1977 and 1983 illustrated his methodical manner of overwhelming opposition. Sometimes more concerted action was called for, as in the cases of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. No doubt Deng fully concurred with Ye Jianying's forthright handling of the arrest of the Gang of Four, as he despised the Gang. 74 Thus, Deng learned much from Mao by negative example. Until his "retirement" in 1990 Deng remained engaged, whereas Mao was more detached and withdrawn from active participation in decision-making. Deng regularly read and commented on documents and met Party leaders (Mao did as well, but to a lesser extent). Deng insisted on being informed, sought and listened to conflicting opinions, and pressed briefers on details. In contrast, Mao's subordinates often remained silent in the Chairman's presence for fear of the consequences of speaking out. Deng insisted on precision and substance from his advisers, and Deng himself was not one to waste words. 75 Mao stopped attending regular Politburo meetings after 1959/ 6 while Deng attended on occasion even into retirement. The Politburo and its Standing Committee were important institutions of rule to Deng, whereas Mao held disdain for them, considering them to be packed with enemies. Deng tried to ensure that they contained his allies. The Central Military Commission was also of great importance to Deng. He retained the chairmanship of the CMC until 1989, having served as a member since 1954.
There was, therefore, a certain collegiality, decisiveness and activeness 72. Zhao Ziyang's statement to Gorbachev that all major decisions were referred to Deng may have been correct, but that does not mean that Deng actually made the decisions.
73. Again, see Oksenberg's discussion of this propensity of Mao's, n. 71. In 1992 Deng reflected on the reasons for having to sack Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, "Two men failed, and they failed not because of problems in the economy but because they stumbled on the issue of opposing bourgeois liberalization. in Deng's workstyle that was absent in Mao's. Deng sought consensus when possible and was certainly more tolerant of dissenting opinions. In general Deng purged but protected his men; Mao attacked them. This was one of Deng's most enduring lessons from the Cultural Revolution. No colleague of Deng's met the fate that befell Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Tao Zhu or Liu Shaoqi. There was an intolerance of opposition in Mao that Deng did not share. 77 When Deng toppled Hua Guofeng, Hua was not pilloried in the press and there was no national campaign of criticism. When Hu Yaobang fell from power Deng insisted that he be permitted to retain his Politburo seat and voting rights. After Zhao Ziyang's fall Deng intervened to protect him from the hardliners who sought stiff punishment, and ensured that Zhao was not expelled from the Party. Indeed, Deng stood behind Zhao at several critical junctures during 1987-89 when Zhao and the radical reform programme came under attack from conservatives. There were further differences between Mao and Deng. Mao never travelled abroad (except the two trips to the Soviet Union); Deng did so more frequently. Deng enjoyed talking to the foreign press; Mao did not. Mao made no effort to learn a foreign language; Deng knew French and apparently spent many years trying to learn English. Deng also received many more foreign visitors in Beijing. Deng had a far better grasp of the intricacies of world affairs and was much more tolerant of a foreign presence in China. Mao was suspicious of the West; Deng held a certain envy of it. Deng was no less nationalistic than Mao, as both were socialized with similar views of the need for a strong and dignified China, but Deng sought the West as an ally in this quest while Mao was more distrustful.
In their personal lives, Mao sought the symbolic trappings of power; Deng lived more frugally. Mao lived in the Zhongnanhai; Deng moved out. Abuse of official privilege was of concern to both Mao and Deng,78 but it must be said that Deng tolerated degrees of corruption unimaginable during the Maoist era. Deng abhorred the Maoist personality cult (geren chongbai) and was determined not to start one of his own (although he assented to the publication of his own Selected Works and those of Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen as well).79 Mao kept concubines and ceased living with Jiang Qing in the 1950s, while Deng truly enjoyed family life with his numerous grandchildren. Deng played bridge and fraternized with his colleagues; Mao was a loner. Both enjoyed reading, and apparently both were devotees of the Shi Ji (Records of the Historian) and other classical Chinese writings. 79. With or without Deng's blessing, an outpouring of sycophantic works praising his achievements appeared after his 1992 Southern Sojourn, and his "thought" was officially proclaimed a "magic weapon" at the 14th Party Congress and enshrined in the CCP Constitution.
Thus there were numerous differences in leadership style between Mao and Deng. In comparing the two, differing modes of leadership have been examined out of the context of the national policy agenda. But no leaders -even paramount ones -operate in a vacuum. Leaders are, after all, chief executives and as such they shape the agenda of the nation.
Deng the Agenda Setter
There are different keys to power for politicians. 80 The importance of various power bases has been noted above. Controlling the substantive agenda of the nation is another source. To do this politicians must first have an agenda of their own. Deng certainly had one. It was centred on enhancing economic productivity and social vitality, and maximizing China's national security. However, Deng was no liberal. He sought to make China strong, but not democratic. He defined strength in demonstrable terms -economic productivity, technological prowess and military muscle. He believed that creative, entrepreneurial and productive forces could be unleashed (the Promethean impulse) without the concomitant loosening of political hegemony. On the contrary, Deng believed tight political control to be vital to achieve his economic goals. In this sense, he shares a view of modernization drawn from the experience of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other newly industrialized countries (NICs).
The operative research question is not so much the content of Deng's agenda, which numerous studies have examined,81 but the manner in which he went about pursuing it. In substantive terms, the origins of Deng's reformist agenda in the 1980s and 1990s can be traced to the Liu-Deng-Chen Yun programme of the early 1960s. It was the series of documents promulgated under Deng's aegis -the 60 Articles, 70 Articles, 14 Articles, and so on -that served as the point of departure. Similarly, the three major policy documents produced under Deng' s instruction in 1975 -which Jiang Qing labelled the "three poisonous weeds" -also helped to constitute the overall programme. 82 Of importance to this analysis is the fact that when he returned to power in 1977 Deng had a preliminary agenda for change. Much more needed to be fleshed out in due course, but the essentials were in place. So was Deng's mandate for change. Like a newly-elected President or Prime Minister, Deng enjoyed a popular mandate for sweeping reform. Many in China recognized that Hua Guofeng was not up to the task, and only Deng had the requisite combination of skills, vision and experience to move the nation. 83 There was an acute leadership vacuum in the wake of the death of Mao and arrest of the Gang of Four, and the Communist Party faced a severe crisis of legitimacy. The society was numbed by years of campaign politics, and permeated by a deep sense of alienation. The economy remained stagnant, frozen at 1957 levels of production, and was falling further behind the rapid growth of China's East Asian neighbours. In foreign affairs, China had opened a relationship with the United States but it was not consummated, lacking full diplomatic relations and the benefits that normalization would bring. 84 China continued to face a pressing military threat of conventional and nuclear proportions from the Soviet Union, and remained locked in hostilities with India and Vietnam.
Benefiting from this kind of implicit mandate, it was not difficult for Deng to seize, set and control the national agenda -particularly once he had disposed of Hua Guofeng, the "whateverists" and "Small Gang of Four." Deng's aim of demolishing the Maoist edifice was essentially accomplished in three years, between 1979 and 1982. During this time Deng moved on many fronts to discredit the Cultural Revolution era and the beneficiaries of it.
Deng first set his sights on Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor. At the Tenth Party Congress in August 1977 and National People's Congress of March 1978, Deng was more than pleased for Hua to reveal his unabashed loyalty to Maoism and naivety about economic growth (ironically Hua's target growth rates were very similar to Deng's own in 1992). Having exposed Hua, Deng then manoeuvred to outflank him on personnel and policy issues at the key Third Plenum of December 1978 and the preceding work conference. Several Deng allies were added to the Politburo and Dengist ideas dominated the policy agenda to emerge from the Plenum. The agricultural responsibility system -already being successfully tested by Deng proteges Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang in Anhui and Sichuan provinces respectively85 -was adopted as national policy and the decollectivization of agriculture was endorsed. "Class struggle" was replaced by "economic modernization" as the principal national goal. Deng also moved to take command of the armed forces (although Hua technically remained Chairman of the Central Military Commission) and began the process of comprehensive reorganization at a CMC meeting in December 1977. He also took the initiative to reassure intellectuals with an assertive speech to the National Science Conference in March 1978. It was in this speech that Deng served notice there would be no more Maoist-style political campaigns, that theoretical research should be unfettered by politics, and scientific exchanges with foreign countries would be a high priority -all at direct variance with Hua's preferences.
Secondly, during 1979 Deng set about revamping the ideological legacy of. Maoism and extracting retribution for Cultural Revolution excesses. The "two whatevers"86 were denounced and replaced by Deng's campaigns for "practice is the sole criterion of truth" and "Four Cardinal Thirdly, and simultaneous with the campaign to unseat Hua, Deng called to account the Gang of Four and vestiges of Lin Biao's military clique by arranging a well-publicized show trial from November 1980 to January 1981. Although no doubt of some consolation to victims of the Gang, the trial more importantly represented a symbolic cleansing for the national body politic. Deng continued this process by rehabilitatingoften posthumously -leading victims of the Cultural Revolution, and compensating those in society who had suffered so severely. Similarly, Deng and Hu Yaobang arranged for victims of the 1957 anti-rightist campaign to be "uncapped" more than 20 years after the event and permitted them to resume work. Deng also permitted Democracy Wall to 85. The use of experimental "test points" (shi dian) was a favoured method of Deng's dating to the 1950s.
86. This was a slogan put forward by Hua that whatever Mao did or said should be adhered to.
87. Adherence to the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. By relegating the latter to only one (and the last) of four elements, Deng dealt Maoist ideology a severe blow. flourish in 1978-79, as it served his purposes in his struggle against Hua because the content of wall posters, publications and speeches all sharply criticized the Maoist era (from which Hua sought to draw legitimacy).
The 92. The economic cycle was more one of expansion-retrenchment, with the latter phase being intentionally induced to cool off overheating, rather than a real business cycle.
93. In point of fact, Deng began to withdraw his support for both these successors nearly a year before their fall from power. In Hu's case, by the middle of 1986 it became clear that he had offended Deng over his desire to accelerate the retirement en masse of the remaining elders on the Central Committee. Hu was also distrusted by the military high command. Deng apparently confronted Hu at an August 1986 Beidaihe work conference and at the subsequent Sixth Plenum in September. By the time student demonstrations erupted in December Hu's fate was sealed. Similarly, in the case of Zhao Ziyang, Deng began to withdraw active support at the August 1988 Beidaihe work conference that led to the When Deng sensed that the agenda had been captured or was being unduly influenced by others he adopted various tactics -some straightforward, some surreptitious -to regain control. Like Mao in similar circumstances, Deng knew that his best weapon was his personal prestige. He would venture into the public arena, make remarks that would become the new tifa of the time, have them published in the newspaper, aired on television and disseminated as Central Documents for study by all cadres.
Perhaps the best example of this tactic was in early 1992. Deng was discontented with the slow pace of economic reform and political dominance of what he termed "leftists," and decided to try and recapture the agenda by visiting the Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones in January and February.94 This was his first public appearance in over a year and, after initial blockage by his opponents (who controlled the propaganda apparatus) his trip was widely publicized in China and his comments made mandatory study for all. Deng's foray into the south launched a fierce intra-leadership struggle leading up to the 14th Party Congress, but he succeeded in reorienting the national agenda and leadership more to his liking. It put pressure on Li Peng and other leaders who favoured a much more controlled approach to economic reform. It also put pressure on the PLA, a conservative institution not particularly in favour of accelerated reform. Deng knew that the PLA was the key player in his succession, and for good measure he took several leading active and retired military officials to the south with him.
Sometimes Deng would try to influence the agenda more indirectly via the media. In February 1990, in an effort to reignite reform in the midst of the post-Tiananmen crackdown, he arranged to have several reformist articles published in the Shanghai newspaper Liberation Daily. His intervention was short-lived however, as the conservative-controlled CCP Propaganda Department refused to replay them nationally. Deng had lost control of both the national agenda and his designated successors. Under such circumstances he was left with no alternative but to invest his personal prestige in his heralded Southern Sojourn.
At other times Deng would support individuals to regain control of the political agenda. In the spring of 1987 he intervened personally to shore up Zhao Ziyang and his programme for accelerated economic and political reform in the run-up to the 13th Party Congress. He knew Zhao lacked the personal clout to push a radical agenda through the Congress, particularly at a time when the conservatives were in the ascent, and so lent his authority to Zhao.
Deng was, to some extent, vulnerable to his ideological critics -Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu -who repeatedly railed against the "erroneous tendencies" that had cropped up as a result of reforms, such as crime, corruption and dissent. Deng never failed to endorse their campaigns. This shows some tactical manoeuvre on his part, but is more indicative of his own intolerance of political liberalism.
Early on Deng established his limits for political and ideological expression in his 1979 speech "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles."95 Yet he personally put political reform on the national agenda in 1980 with his speech "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership" (which he essentially defined as administrative reform).96 Less than a year later Deng ordered the closing of Democracy Wall after posters began to call for Western-style democracy, and he ensured that Wei Jingsheng received a stiff IS-year sentence for advocating a "fifth modernization." In 1983 Deng launched the inner-Party rectification campaign against Cultural Revolution beneficiaries (the "three kinds of people" or san zhong ren 97 ) Simultaneously (at the Sixth Plenum), Deng endorsed the campaign against "spiritual pollution." Within two months he had quietly withdrawn his endorsement of the campaign, but still endorsed Hu Qiaomu's attack on the proponents of "humanism" and "alienation" in 1984.
In 1986 Deng thought it a propitious time to push for further political reform. Following Tiananmen Deng initially acquiesced to the ideologies and hardliners, yet by 1991 showed signs of frustration with the conservative leadership.102 This was expressed in various ways, but ultimately in his Southern Tour. Deng's decision to emerge from retirement to re-energize the reform process had much to do with the lessons he drew from the collapse of Soviet and East European Communism. Deng apparently concluded that Communist rule crumbled in these countries because it had failed to deliver the goods, because political reform advanced ahead of economic reform, and because the regimes concerned did not have adequate control over their militaries and security services. Deng decided that for the CCP to survive, the material well-being of the populace must be rapidly improved; political reform must be postponed and the formation of any groups that could challenge the hegemony of the Communist Party must be suppressed; and the absolute loyalty of the military to the Party must be ensured.
Thus, in terms of agenda-setting, Deng Xiaoping demonstrated different strategies and tactics throughout his career. At times -during the 1950s and 1960s -he tended to work within and through central Party and state institutions, although he became quite assertive in 1963-64. In the mid-1970s, with the blessing of Premier Zhou and Chairman Mao, he gained an authority and independence he did not possess before the Cultural Revolution. During the 1980s and 1990s Deng employed a combination of these and other tactics. Generally speaking, though, Deng controlled the national agenda through classic balancing tactics.103 Deng bargained through balancing, and vice versa. His proclivity was to support radical reform, and he would push it when he could, but Deng's pragmatism more often made him occupy the middle ground.
By adopting varying leadership styles Deng has acted not unlike other politicians. Compromise and coalition building are necessary parts of the political process. So is bureaucracy; bureaucracies implement policies, but they also sabotage them. A leader needs to work through institutions, but also needs to circumvent them at times. Institutions create paperwork, and much of the governmental process is consumed with drafting and promulgating documents. Making speeches, using the power of the press and making forays into public to take one's message to the masses are standard devices for political agenda-setting in most countries. Deng has proved Chinese politics not very different in these respects.
Conclusion
In summarizing the political style of Deng Xiaoping, it may be instructive to recall the typology of leadership offered in 1978 by American political scientist James MacGregor Burns. 104 Bums elaborated nine distinct leadership styles, but argued that they clustered into two principal types: transformational and transactional. Transformational leaders, Bums argued, seek to transform society through ideas. They are generally intellectuals who pursue an ideological agenda of comprehensive social reform. Revolutionaries are one sub-type of transformational leader, and Bums -writing before Deng's ascendance -was quick to note the inclusion of Maoist China in this category. He observed that leaders of developing countries were often of the transformational type.
Bums found transactional leadership, on the other hand, to be more rooted in developed polities. Transactional leaders fit within a structuralfunctionalist interest aggregation model where public opinion is mobilized, interest groups act as a two-way channel for communicating political interest, and political parties aggregate diverse public interests and convey them to government for conversion into public policy.
Just as with Mao Zedong, the transformational leadership model helps to describe and understand Deng Xiaoping's leadership style and political behaviour. This probably says more, however, about the nature of the Chinese political system than it does about Deng. While opinion clusters, interest groups, and intra-governmental bargaining certainly exist in China, and Deng Xiaoping's reforms have done much to stimulate the rise of rudimentary civil society (and hence the public sphere approach to studying Chinese politics), China remains a developing country. China is an unparalleled political mass, excepting perhaps India. To "move a nation" (to quote John F. Kennedy) transformational leadership is required. As the East Asian experience has shown, the state can be a powerful force for socio-economic change if its leadership has a strong mandate, clear agenda and motivated working class. Deng had all three.
By initiating economic reform, however, Deng Xiaoping unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that threaten to overwhelm the Communist party-state he sought to preserve. Deng studied the East Asian developmental model carefully, but learned incomplete lessons. He did not, or refused to, recognize the inevitable political pressures that well up from below as a result of economic growth and wealth accumulation. These inexorably breed popular demands for meaningful political participation and an improved quality of life (in, for example, environment, education, health care). To accommodate these demands devolution of political power is necessary, leading in time to an erosion of the hegemony of the party-state and the beginnings of democracy. Deng failed to recognize this linkage, and failed to create the institutional mechanisms for improved political participation. It is the most vexing problem he will bequeath to his successors. In the end, Deng failed to grasp the most fundamental of all Marxist precepts -the influence of the economic base on the political superstructure -and his successors may have to pay dearly for this obstinacy.
